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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme

*

to Utah Code And. "i '8- 2-2 { I ,• i I

J.H w*^~ matter pursuant
I'/I " i

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
W h e t h e r a a HI 11 > s 11111 111 1 11«I« 11l!' evidence regarding the

I.

Zions litigation was prejudicial ertui.
Standard of Review:
ruling w a s clear i» »

Whether the trial court's
Whitehead v,

PIIUIKMIII!.,

American Motors Sales Corp, , 801 »'" ,"«! M <""<I {III.\it

II.

Whether the nil

Lii ii-.k-fll - • k.

UMKI1

hetween these

T^*-^ required written notice of default as a condit ton
precede. .

,

.ma; or implied breach of the lease,

barring MLL's contract «_,«*
Standard of Review:
corr ecti less.

De novo review for

Kimball u Campbell, 699 P.2d 7 14

(Utah 1985).
ill

iWhether the 19 BO Amended Ground Lease, by its terms,

provided tiutit i

i

MJ*I

'«,'«

pi n|i i biting Middlet.ons from,

interfering w . " I -ir requiring l luiti " .i

no

MLL

"I i'lop the subiect property.
Standard m
correctness.
I"" "'

Review,

bu iiuvj" review for

Kimball v, Campbell, supid.

Whf'il hir-i" the tihil t ourt erreii as a matter of lav v "

awarding M L L attorneys fc^f- ii

MI»H

i

n'Mini

failed ^ 0 specify a

Plaintiff/Appellee will be referred to herein as MLTf

finding of a breach of the express terms of the 1980 Amended
Ground Lease.
Standard of Review;
correctness.

De novo review for

Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d

266 (Utah 1992).
V.

Whether the trial court erred by ruling that, as a

matter of law, all defendants were jointly and severally liable
on the breach of contract claims, even though they leased the
property as tenants in common and did not expressly agree to
joint liability.
Standard of Review;
correctness.
VI.

De novo review for

Kimball v. Campbell, supra.

Whether MLL failed to present substantial evidence to

establish that threats of litigation by Anthony W. Middleton, Jr.
caused damage to MLL.
Standard of Review;

Whether there is any

substantial evidence from which the jury
could have reasonably reached the verdict
without resorting to speculation or drawing
unreasonable inferences.

Morgan v.

Quailbrook Condominium Co.. 704 P.2d 573
(Utah 1985).
VII. Whether, as a matter of law, a threat of litigation not
followed by suit and adjudication favorable to MLL is legally
sufficient to satisfy the "improper purpose and improper means"
element of MLL's tortious interference claim.
- 2 -

itn n o v o r e v i e w for

Standard of R e v i e w :
' 11 - rec t, me * :•-

Uchail

* , UMCl..»."'or p „

i" 00 I'.^d 1068

(Utah 1985).
Villi
m a t t e r 'J"

Whether the* ti" ia. I
!• •

•

the real property

•

• •""

in q u e s t i o n ,

ourt erred
,

in f a i l i n g t o r u l e a s a

^llc'ik
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property.

Standard of Review:

IX.

" •• MLI and i-.u^iers of

were p r i v i l e g e * 1 in

nerjnl' inl MUM I HI s u b l e a s e of t h e

correctness

,

iur

Scharf v. B M G Corp,, supra.
i i',1 instructions erroneously stated *-*-•->.

t "hi

applicable law respecting daroafje?

• H M < i,v r.ormiM • nn a iiouL^e

recovery and relieving HT,I mi its duty to mitigate.
bLanUiAi J ui Reviei
correctness.

i• novo r ev iew f or

Ramon v. Fart"

i

I

(Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Constitutional Provisions.
-•'-••. i i . | Courts open • Redress of injuries ]
All courts shall be open, and e ver y pcj.0w«.
. _ injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any -v-H1 « • • *-o which he is a party.
B.

Rules of Evidence.

Rule 403

Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

„

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of The Case.

This action arises out of a landlord-tenant relationship
which has existed between plaintiff and defendants since 1975.
It is the second major lawsuit which the lease between the
parties has spawned.

The plaintiff in this action, Medical

Leasing, Ltd. (lfMLL") is the lessee of a 10-acre parcel of land
on the northwest corner of 39th South and 7th East in Salt Lake
City.

Defendants (collectively, "Middletons") are the fee owners

of the property and landlords to MLL.

The instant case arose

when consummation of a sublease which MLL had been negotiating
with The Boyer Company for some eighteen months was allegedly
prevented or interfered with by conduct of defendant Anthony W.
Middleton, Jr.

MLL had demanded certain amendments and

concessions from Middletons to facilitate the Boyer sublease and
when they were not forthcoming, threatened to sue and then
ultimately commenced this action.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

On February 16, 1990, Medical Leasing filed this action.
at 2.

The original Complaint had five claims.

for a declaratory judgment and injunction.

R.

Count I prayed

Count II was a claim

for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in
the 1980 Amended Ground Lease between the parties.
- 4 -

Count III was

for intentional interference with contract.

Count IV was for

intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and
Count V was for attorney's fees under the Amended Ground Lease,
All of the claims were asserted against the other Middletons on
the basis that Anthony Middleton acted as an agent of the other
Middletons; no separate claim of joint and several liability was
made.

Complaint, R. at 2-26.

Following defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court
dismissed Count I, finding that the Middletons had no contractual
obligation to consent to attornment or to the proposed Boyer
sublease.

R. 301-2.

(the Order is included in Appellants'

Addendum as Exhibit 1).

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (R.

319) including all the original claims except those for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

The claims again

asserted the other Middletons were liable because Anthony
Middleton acted as their agent; again, no separate claim of joint
and several liability was made.
Defendants moved for summary judgment.

R. at 447, 584. The

court granted summary judgment against plaintiff only on its
second claim, for intentional interference with the development
contract.

The court held as a matter of law that there was no

contract between Boyer Company and MLL which could be the subject
of an interference claim as it had expired by its own terms.
at 1078.

(See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 2).

proceeded to trial on the remaining claims.

- 5 -

The case

R.

Over defendants' objections, the Court admitted evidence at
trial which Middletons assert should have been excluded,
including, among other things:

evidence about the Middletons7

claims in prior litigation involving Zions Bank, inferring that
it was not meritorious, even though that action was settled and
compromised.

Objections:

Motion in Limine, R. at 1215-17; Trial

Transcript, R. at 4007, 4024, 4042, 4114, 4115.
Defendants objected to various jury instructions given by
the Court, including:
a.

the elements of intentional interference with

prospective relations and privileges associated therewith;
b.

submission of any issue of breach of express

contract or implied covenant of good faith;
c.

the plaintiff's duty of mitigation; and

d.

the analysis and calculation of damages.

The jury returned a verdict,2 finding:
a.

Anthony Middleton and Carol Middleton tortiously

and intentionally interfered with Medical Leasing's
prospective economic relations [R. at 1569]; and
b.

Anthony and Carol Middleton breached "the express

terms of the Amended Ground Lease and/or their implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."

[R. at 1572].

The jury found compensatory damages in the amount of
$2,582,780 (R. at 1574), which is the present value of all of the

The Special Verdict was incorporated in the Judgment which is
included in Appellants' Addendum as Exhibit 6.

- 6 -

l e a s e payments t o be made by Boyer t o Medical Leasing under t h e
proposed s u b l e a s e for i t s f u l l term as though t h e i r l e a s e were
signed and i n e f f e c t .
The jury found t h e other Middletons did not t o r t i o u s l y
i n t e r f e r e with p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o s p e c t i v e economic r e l a t i o n s (R. a t
1 5 6 9 - 7 0 ) , and did not breach the l e a s e or any covenant of good
faith.

R. a t 1572-73.

After t r i a l , t h e t r i a l court h e l d , as a matter of law:
a.

t h a t n e i t h e r t h e Lease nor t h e law required MLL t o

g i v e Middletons w r i t t e n n o t i c e of the a l l e g e d breach of t h e
Lease before claiming d e f a u l t under t h e Lease;
b.

t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t paragraph 8 of

t h e Amended Ground Lease was breached (R. a t 2944, 1. 9 - 1 3 ) ;
c.

t h a t a l l defendants were j o i n t l y l i a b l e under t h e

Lease for Anthony M i d d l e t o n s breach of the Lease and/or
breach of t h e covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g (R. a t
2962); and
d.

t h a t p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y s f e e s

under t h e Lease for defendants' breach of t h e Lease, i n the
amount of $275,000. R. a t 2941-42. 3 (See. A p p e l l a n t s '
Addendum, Exhibit 6.)

3

Middletons reserved t h e i r r i g h t t o c o n t e s t MLL's claim for a t t o r n e y s '
f e e s and t o c o n t e s t the award of f e e s and/or the amount of f e e s for MLL's
f a i l u r e t o " a l l o c a t e time and f e e s for (1) s u c c e s s f u l claims for which there
may be an e n t i t l e m e n t t o attorney f e e s , (2) unsuccessful claims for which
t h e r e would have been an e n t i t l e m e n t t o attorney f e e s had t h e claims been
s u c c e s s f u l , and (3) claims for which there i s no e n t i t l e m e n t t o attorney
f e e s . " R. at 2951.
-

7

-

The jury found in special interrogatories that (a) Anthony
and Carol4 Middleton had (i) intentionally interfered with MLL's
prospective economic relationship with The Boyer Company (R. at
1569) and (ii) breached the express terms of the lease and/or the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. at 1572), (b) the
other Middletons did not interfere (R. at 1569-70) or breach the
lease (R. at 1572-73), and (c) MLL should recover punitive
damages from Anthony Middleton.

R. at 1574.

The jury found

damages to MLL in the amount of $2,582,780 (R. at 1574) and at a
separate hearing, punitive damages of $75,000.

R. at 1584. (See.

Appellants/ Addendum, Exhibit 6.)
Following the jury's verdict, Judge Rigtrup ruled that all
Middletons were jointly liable for the breach of lease by Anthony
and Carol Middleton.

R. at 2962.

After denying defendants'

Motions for JNOV or a New Trial, the Court entered judgment in
favor of MLL against all Middletons jointly on the claim of
breach of lease and/or breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and against Anthony and Carol Middleton on the claim of
intentional interference with prospective economic relationship,
M

in the amount of $2,582,780, together with interest thereon at

the rate of 10% per annum from and after February 28, 1992 to the
date of judgment . . . and thereafter at the rate of 12% per
annum," for attorney's fees ,fin the amount of $275,000 together
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after the

Carol Middleton'8 liability was based on a finding that her husband,
Tony Middleton, was her agent.

- 8 -

date judgment i s e n t e r e d , " and c o s t s .
A p p e l l a n t s ' Addendum, Exhibit 6.)

R. a t 2964. (See,

I t i s from t h i s Judgment t h a t

Middletons appeal.
STATEMENT OF PACTS

Middletons are the owners as t e n a n t s in common5 of 10 acres
of r e a l property a t t h e corner of 7th East and 39th South in S a l t
Lake City.

The property was previously owned s o l e l y by R. P.

Middleton, Anthony W. Middleton, Sr. and Delores Middleton,
b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r .

R. P. Middleton gave h i s i n t e r e s t in t h e

property t o h i s c h i l d r e n , R. G. Middleton (R. a t 4972), Mary
Middleton Dahl and V i c t o r i a Ann Stearn, and R. G . ' s wife, Jane.
Anthony W. Middleton, Sr. gave h i s i n t e r e s t in the property t o
h i s sons, Anthony W. Middleton, J r . (R. a t 4317) and George W.
Middleton, and t h e i r wives, 6 Carol and Jean.

Delores Middleton,

who i s a r e s i d e n t of the D i s t r i c t of Columbia (R. a t 321, J 9,
412, J 9 ) , has r e t a i n e d her i n t e r e s t in t h e property.
In 1975, t h e Middletons leased the r e a l t y t o MLL's
predecessor u n t i l t h e year 2025, with a 30-year option for
renewal.

The t e n a n t proposed t o c o n s t r u c t a s u r g i c a l center on

two acres of t h e p r o p e r t y .

The Middletons consented t o

subordinate 7 t o t h e construction lender t h e i r fee i n t e r e s t in t h e
Ownership as t e n a n t s in common was a l l e g e d in the Amended Complaint,
I I 5-13, R. at 321-22, and admitted in Middletons' answers, R. at 391-92 and
412. See, a l s o . R. at 899, 1. 16-18.
6

George and Jean Middleton have s i n c e divorced.

7

The o r i g i n a l Ground Lease in 1975 s t a t e d : "Tenant has represented t o
Landlord t h a t i t w i l l be impossible for i t t o finance the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
Surgical Center without t h e subordination of the Landlord of i t s f e e t i t l e t o

- 9 -

two acres where the surgical center would be built.
9-14.

Ex. P-l at

The lease also provided that "Landlord does not agree to

subordinate the fee title of any of the Lease Property except as
to the two acres referred to above.11

Id. at 14.

An Amended Ground Lease between MLL and Middletons (Ex. P3), made in 1980, provided for a term to July 31, 2025 with a 15year option to renew.

In that Amended Ground Lease, Middletons

agreed to subordinate an additional .75 acre to facilitate
construction of an addition to the surgical center.

Ex. P-3 at

7-12 (the 1980 Amended Ground Lease is included in Appellants'
Addendum as Exhibit 7).
Each of the Middletons signed the Amended Ground Lease
("Lease") separately as "Landlord".
Middletons believed they would be able to participate in
further development rentals because they understood that if MLL
did undertake to sublease the rest of the property to a major
independent developer, as a practical matter, the developer or
the developer's lender would very likely insist that MLL obtain
the Middletons' agreement to subordinate the fee to the
development lender's lien (R. at unnumbered page following 5701)
and/or to the developer's or his subtenant's leaseholds, or
require other consent or changes in the lease.
5001-2, 5004.

R. at 4998-99,

The Middletons anticipated that if MLL asked for

consent or subordination for development, they could rightfully
ask for more income on the Lease in return.
the two acres . . ." Ex. P-l at 10.
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R. at 5004.

In one

sense MLL had a similar view:

if MLL asked Middletons for

consent, they knew Middletons would ask for more money.

R. at

4916.
In 1980, MLL subleased part of the undeveloped portion of
the property to Zions Bank.

Ex. P-4.

The sublease included a

right to cure provision, which mirrored the provision in the
Lease:
In the event Lessor receives any notice of any default
under said Amended Ground Lease, Lessor shall promptly,
no later than three (3) days from the receipt of said
notice by Lessor, deliver to Lessee a copy of said
notice. Lessee may elect, in its sole discretion, to
cure said default on behalf of Lessor and thereby
reinstate and continue in effect said Amended Ground
Lease. In the event Lessee remedies any such default .
• • [Lessor is responsible for Lessee's costs.]
Ex. P-4, f 15.
Although the Middletons were not asked to subordinate their
fee, Zions insisted the Middletons expressly consent to Zions
sublease and MLL insisted that such consent be given without
compensation.

Ex. P-6.

Zions, over MLL's objections (R. at

4161), sued MLL and the Middletons for consent or a declaration
that consent was not necessary.

Zions Utah Bancorooration v.

Medical Leasing Limited, et al.. in the Third District Court of
Utah, Civil No. C83-713.

See. Zions Complaint, Ex. P-10.

In

October, 1985, the parties reached a settlement by which MLL paid
the Middletons $21,000 (Ex. P-17, pp. 4-5, 5-9) and the parties
agreed to a mutual release of all claims and a stipulation that
restated paragraph 8 of the 1980 Amended Ground Lease.

Ex. P-16

pp. 4-5 (the Zions Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
- 11 -

Order, including the Stipulation, are included in Appellants'
Addendum as Exhibit 8).
In 1987, MLL began to discuss further development of the
remaining property with The Boyer Company.

R. at 4050.

Because

MLL did not want to share any proceeds from such development with
the owners of the land, neither MLL nor Boyer disclosed the
proposed development to the Middletons until late July of 1989.
Dr. Wong, R. at 4894-95.
In June, 1988, MLL and Boyer Company signed a development
agreement (Ex. P-22) whereby Boyer Company contemplated the
sublease and development of the remaining six acres, conditioned,
among other things, upon Boyer Company getting the property .
rezoned for a commercial use and the parties signing a sublease
by December 31, 1988.

This development agreement specified the

exact rents Boyer Company would pay MLL over the 52-year term,
including escalation based on the higher of consumer price index
increases or the increases in rents Boyer Company might receive
from subtenants over a stated baseline.

Later, the time within

which the sublease was to be signed was extended to January 31,
1989.

Ex. P-32.

The Boyer Company obtained rezoning and "was prepared to
remove the contingencies of the Development Agreement1* (Ex. P32), but MLL failed to prepare the first draft of the proposed
sublease until February 3, 1989, three days after the development
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agreement had expired by i t s terms.

Ex. D-30. 8

After examining

t h e proposed s u b l e a s e on March 14, 1989, Boyer Company's lawyer
Vic Taylor wrote MLL's lawyer John Parsons t h a t a number of
"business hurdles" had t o be overcome (Ex. D-14), before
addressing other concerns with the proposed s u b l e a s e .

The

"business hurdles" t o overcome included:
(1)

t h a t t y i n g t h e rent t o MLL i n part on Boyer's

r e n t a l s from subtenants " v i o l a t e s the l e t t e r and s p i r i t " of
t h e p r o v i s i o n in paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease
under which MLL could sublease without Middleton consent,
and t h a t "the Sublessee i s u n w i l l i n g t o take t h e r i s k of
such v i o l a t i o n , t h e r e s u l t of which could be termination" of
t h e Amended Ground Lease;
(2)

t h a t MLL must obtain Middleton consent t o t h e

Boyer Company s u b l e a s e ; and
(3)

t h a t MLL and t h e Middletons must again amend t h e

Amended Ground Lease t o provide t h a t i f MLL d e f a u l t e d on t h e
ground l e a s e , t h e Middletons would "attorn" t o Boyer Company
and perform MLL's o b l i g a t i o n s t o Boyer Company9 under t h e
s u b l e a s e and accept Boyer Company's performance of

its

8

The t r i a l court, r u l i n g on defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment,
s p e c i f i c a l l y concluded t h a t , as a matter of law, the development agreement
between MLL and Boyer expired by i t s terms on January 31, 1989. R. at 1078.
See, A p p e l l a n t s ' Addendum, Exhibit 2 .
This attornment p r o v i s i o n would impose MLL's d u t i e s t o Boyer Company
on Middletons. Under the Lease, Middletons are not required t o do s o . See,
d i s c u s s i o n i n Point V of the Brief f i l e d by co-defendants.
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obligation under the sublease or by any sublessee of or
lender to Boyer.
MLL objected to Boyer making requests of the Middletons for
such concessions, anticipating that Middletons would ask for more
money.

R. at 4170. MLL's position was that Boyer Company's

lawyer was wrong on the first two points; it refused to change
the rent clause and said that Boyer Company ought to be content
with the "right to cure" clause which Zions had accepted, rather
than the attornment clause Boyer demanded.

MLL believed and

MLL's lawyer wrote to Boyer Company on April 10, 1989 that the
Middletons would find Boyer's requests unreasonable.
Ex. D-15.

R. at 4399,

MLL insisted that Boyer Company was legally bound by

the development agreement to sign the proposed sublease without
material changes and threatened suit if necessary to force that
result.

R. at 4570; 4199.

In May, 1989, in an effort to mollify MLL, Boyer Company
explained to its mortgage broker, Bonneville Mortgage Company,
the nature of the proposed transaction and asked if financing
could be arranged.

Banks, R. at 5396.

Boyer Company's mortgage

broker asked its legal counsel, Greg Bell, for an opinion
respecting the "financeability of the proposed arrangement," and
If, in your professional opinion the proposed
ground lease(s) are not acceptable to our investors,
please so advise at your earliest convenience so that
we can so advise our client.
Ex. D-17.
Greg Bell advised Bonneville Mortgage Company and Boyer
Company that Middletons' consent and attornment, inter
- 14 -

alia,

would be required by a lender, and that the proposed transaction
was likely too complicated to be financed at all. Mr. Bell
agreed with Mr. Taylor's opinions set forth in Taylor's letter of
March 14, 1989.

Ex. D-14, Ex. D-18.

On July 25, 1989, Drs. Ring, Wong and Adair and their
lawyer, John Parsons, met with Roger Boyer, his lawyer, Vic
Taylor, and Greg Gardner.

R. 4116.

They discussed the concerns

Vic Taylor had previously expressed, which are identified in his
March 14, 1989 letter.

Parsons, R. at 4531.

Dr. Ring

interrupted and declared "we are not going to the Middletons.H
Id. at 4532.

According to Dr. Ring, Boyer said "we can work

around that," (Dr. Ring, R. at 4121, 1. 5-6) and that Boyer
R. at 4121.10

wanted "to make a deal, not break a deal."

Although the Amended Ground Lease directed that all rents
and notices be sent to Dr. Richard P. Middleton for all of the
Middletons, Boyer, nevertheless, wanted to speak with Dr. Anthony
(Tony) Middleton, whom he knew personally, about the project.
4122.

R.

MLL continued to insist that the sublease go forward

without contacting the Middletons at all.

Boyer stated to MLL at

the July 25, 1989 meeting that he was concerned about getting
into a "litigation box," —

that is, he feared he would be sued

whether he contacted the Middletons or not.

R. 4121.

Middletons objected to Dr. Ring's hearsay testimony on this subject.
A lengthy bench conference was held on the objection and the court heard
specific argument but eventually allowed the testimony. R. at 4057-4059,
4060-4082, 4105f 4112.
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Finally, MLL reluctantly acquiesced and agreed Boyer could
talk to Tony Middleton.

R. at 4298,

Boyer contacted Tony

Middleton in late July of 1989 (R. at 5530) to tell him of the
proposed development and to seek assurance that the Middletons
would not sue.

This was the first time any of the Middletons

knew of the negotiations between MLL and Boyer Company (R. at
4895, 4981, and 5530) which had been going on for almost two
years.

Tony Middleton told his cousin, Dr. Richard G. Middleton

("R.G.'1), of the conversation with Boyer.

R. at 4981.

MLL's Dr.

Harry Wong, who worked daily in the same hospital with R.G., told
R.G. that Boyer was going to develop the property without
subordination, that Roger Boyer was going to talk to Tony
Middleton about it in a few days and asked if R.G. wanted to
attend.

R. at 4895, 4909.

R.G. told Dr. Wong that his presence

was not necessary if subordination were not required (id.) and
said that Tony did not speak for the other two-thirds of the
Middleton family.

R. at 4910.

Dr. Wong acknowledged this

conversation and admitted that he knew that the rest of the
Middleton family sometimes disagreed with Tony.

R. at 4910.

On August 7 or 8, 1989, Boyer met with Tony Middleton.
Boyer told Tony that his lawyers were of the opinion that the
Middletons' consent to the sublease was needed and that Boyer was
of the same opinion.

R. 5534; R. 5601. Boyer also told Tony that

MLL had threatened to sue Boyer Company if it didn't proceed with
the project.

R. 5539, 5540.
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Other meetings were held among Tony# Boyer and MLL
representatives.

At those meetings, Tony Middleton stated he was

in favor of Boyer developing the property and when asked to
assure that the Middletons would not sue, said he believed the
Middletons would agree not to contest the contract in court in
exchange for more rent.

R. at 4463.

He said:

Basically that, in my opinion, that if this project,
with The Boyer Company, was not appropriately dealt
with so that all parties involved were appropriately
part of the project, that it would inevitably lead to
future litigation by this generation of the Middleton
family or by subsequent generations of the Middleton
family.
R. at 5543.
Dr. Wally Ring characterized Tony Middleton's statement more
graphically, suggesting that: "If a stake goes in the ground, the
Middletons will sue."

R. at 4126-27. After this September 26,

1989 meeting, Tony Middleton recorded his impressions of the
meeting in his diary.

Ex. P-37.

In October and early November,

1989, Drs. Ring and Wong discussed with Tony Middleton the
possibility of MLL paying the Middletons $10,000 to $25,000 in
exchange for the Middletons' cooperation in providing Boyer an
acceptable sublease arrangement.
48.

R. at 4135-44, 4926-34, 5546-

Ultimately, however, MLL refused to pay the Middletons any

money.

Dr. Ring, moreover, verbally threatened Tony Middleton

with suit if the Middletons would not amend the 1980 Amended
Ground Lease.

He told Tony Middleton that MLL had a $100,000 war

chest in reserve for such a suit.

R. at 4144-45, 5552.
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Dr. Ring

testified that Tony Middleton also threatened to sue in these
October and November meetings•

R. at 4141-44•

On November 17, 1989, MLL wrote to Anthony Middleton,
threatening suit if the Middletons did not amend the 1980 Amended
Ground Lease to provide an attornment clause, give further
consent to the Boyer sublease and agree to other concessions
asked by Boyer's lawyer in his March 14, 1989 letter.

Ex. P-39.

When Anthony's lawyer asked for a copy of the proposed sublease
to consider approving it (Ex. D-31), MLL refused to provide it
unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for more rent and
not to sue.

Ex. P-42.

Also on November 17, 1989, MLL wrote Boyer Company
threatening suit if Boyer did not sign the proposed sublease in
10 days and stating that Anthony's "threats of litigation" "as a
representative of the Middleton family" were unfounded.

Ex. P-

40.
Boyer's lawyer responded twice, first writing that "The
Boyer Company does not view the threats made by Tony Middleton as
'without basis in law or fact . . .'"

Ex. D-30. He later wrote

on February 5, 1990 that Boyer was not bound to sign the sublease
because the Development Agreement had expired months before and
Boyer was terminating negotiations because "Medical Leasing has
been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the landowner
to make the ground lease financeable."

Ex. D-39.

At a meeting on February 15, 1990, MLL's Dr. Ring continued
to ask Boyer if he would not be satisfied with a right to cure
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clause, as Zions had accepted, instead of the attornment clause
Boyer's lawyer wanted; But Boyer still did not agree to go
forward.

He said his lawyer would have to review it.

Ex. D-58.

The Amended Ground Lease requires a defaulting party to pay
the prevailing party's attorney's fees.

It specifically provides

that a party is not in default until 30 days after written notice
from the other specifying the particulars on which a party has
failed to perform and those particulars remain unrectified for
that period. Ex. P-3, I 8, p. 6-7 (See, Appellants' Addendum,
Exhibit 7).

It further requires notice to the landlord be given

by certified mail addressed to the person to whom rent is
payable, which is Dr. Richard P. Middleton.
15.

Ex. P-3, J 12, p.

No such notice was given to Anthony, to Richard P.

Middleton, nor to the prior counsel for the Middletons, Moyle &
Draper, with whom prior negotiations had been conducted.

Neither

did Dr. Harry Wong ever mention any complaint about Anthony to
Dr. Richard G. Middleton (R. at 4909), notwithstanding that they
continued to work daily in the same hospital, Dr. Wong often
attending as anesthesiologist in R.G.'s surgeries.

R. at 4908.

Neither the Middletons nor Boyer acceded to MLL's November
17, 1989 demands.

On or about February 16, 1990, MLL filed this

action against the Middletons.

R. at 2.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Over objections raised by Motion in Limine and continued
through trial, the lower court admitted evidence, claims and
allegations from a previously settled case to prove its claims in
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this matter.

Admission of such evidence was legally precluded,

highly prejudicial and plain error.
MLL failed to properly perfect its breach of contract claims
by giving notice of breach and a right to cure as required by the
lease between the parties.

Moreover, the lease provides no

affirmative duty which was breached by Middletons or which was
sufficient to support implication of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
The evidence connecting MLL's damage claim to conduct of the
Middletons is entirely inference.

From the primary facts that

The Boyer Company did not wish to be involved in litigation and
Tony Middleton threatened litigation, the jury concluded that the
threat caused Boyer to refuse MLL's proposed sublease.

This

inference, however, is contradicted and destroyed by direct,
unrebutted evidence from Roger Boyer and his lawyer.

Not only

did they testify that MLL's unwillingness to compromise and
inability to obtain financing were indeed the reasons why the
deal failed, but they also testified that they never intended to
accept the terms of MLL's proposed sublease.

With the inference

destroyed, MLL has no substantial evidence upon which to sustain
its causation element and damage calculations.
The gravamen of MLL's tortious interference claim is a
"threat of suit" by Tony Middleton.

This thin reed supports

MLL's entire tort and punitive damage claim.

As a matter of

sound public policy, a threat of suit should never be sufficient
to support a claim unless the threatened suit is first proven to
be groundless and unfounded.

To hold otherwise has a very real

chilling effect upon the rights of citizens to contemplate and
utilize the courts of this state for resolution of disputes.
With a tort as nebulous as interference with a prospective
economic relationship, not only should citizens be allowed to
talk about protecting their rights in court but they should be
privileged to do so as a matter of law.
Finally, the trial court erred in allowing MLL to both
recover future rental income and retain possession of the
property.

The Judgment is contrary to the rule of law

encouraging continuing mitigation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ADMISSION OF MLL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
ZIONS LAWSUIT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Several years before commencement of the instant case, Zions
Bank sued MLL and the Middletons (the "Zions Litigation").

That

suit was resolved through a Stipulation, Mutual Release of Claims
and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice entered in March of 1986.
Exs. P-16, P-17 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 8).

Prior to

trial of the present case, Middletons filed Motions In Limine
seeking to preclude MLL from introducing at trial certain
testimony and documents pertaining to the Zions Litigation.

In

their Motions In Limine, Middletons argued that evidence relating
to the claims alleged and factual context of the Zions case was
precluded on the grounds of relevance, materiality, principles of
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issue preclusion and operative language in the Mutual Release
entered between the parties, R. at 1215-17.
The trial court denied Middletons' Motions In Limine and,
over Middletons' continuing objections11, allowed MLL to
introduce into evidence pleadings12, correspondence, and
deposition testimony from the Zions case and testimony regarding
the merits of the Middleton claims in that litigation.

Allowing

the introduction of this evidence was plain error, highly
prejudicial to defendants.
It is undisputed that the Zions case was settled and
resolved by means of a Stipulation and Mutual Release Of Claims
and Order of Dismissal entered among MLL and the Middletons in
1985.13
8).

Exs. P-16 and P-17 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit

Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation provides:
The defendants Middleton. third party
defendants and Medical Leasing do hereby
mutually release, acquit and forever
discharge each other from all claims, causes
of action alleged in or arising out of. or in
any way connected with the action referred to
above, or relating to any delay in commencing
construction by Zions. Provided, however,
the Stipulation as to the intent and meaning
11

See R. at 4007, 4024, 4042, 4114, 4115.

Plaintiff8 introduced correspondence, the Complaint, Third Party
Complaint, Order And Judgment, Answer and Counterclaim, Stipulation And Mutual
Release of All Claims, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
See, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16. Middletons did
not object to admission of the Stipulation, Order of Dismissal and Findings of
Fact. It is the pleadings, testimony, and correspondence relating to facts
and claims leading up to the Stipulation and resolution of the Zions case to
which Middletons objected.
13

MLL, not Zions, paid Middletons $21,000 to effect settlement. Exs.
P-16 and P-17 (See. Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 8).
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of Paragraph 8 of the Amended ground Lease,
as set forth in Paragraph 5, herein, is not
affected by this mutual release.
Id.

[emphasis added.]

The Mutual Release between the parties

plainly precludes MLL from again raising, in support of their
claims in this case, the underlying facts and assertions of the
Middleton claims in the Zions case.

By allowing introduction of

MLL's evidence from the old Zions case, the trial court
effectively allowed MLL to try the Zions case within the
framework of this action.
"[Settlements are favored by the law and should be
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to
the parties, but also to the judicial system."

Murray v. State

of Utah, 737 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1987) fquoting Tracy-Collins Bank &
Trust v. Travelstead. 595 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)).

"[0]ne who

agrees to settle his claim cannot subsequently seek both the
benefit of the settlement and the opportunity to continue to
press the claim he agreed to settle."
661, 664 (11th Cir. 1984).

Kirbv v. Dole. 736 F.2d

The settlement agreement is res

judicata of and bars litigation of "all matters relating to the
subject matter of the dispute."

Rasmussen v. Allstate Insurance

Co. . 726 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).

rRlecrardless of

what the actual merits of the antecedent claim may have been,
they will not be afterward inquired into and examined." 15
Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 25 (1976 & Supp. April
1992) [emphasis added.]
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The finality and certainty afforded by settlement of a
lawsuit is perhaps the single most important advantage of
settlement•

Only by ignoring the language of the Mutual Release

and the well-established policy of encouraging negotiated
settlement of lawsuits could the court permit MLL to introduce
its evidence relating to the old claims asserted in the Zions
case and then allow it to directly attack the merits of those
claims.
In fairness to the trial court, it was misled by MLL's
representations at the commencement of trial.

MLL's counsel, Mr.

Burbidge, stated in support of the admission of evidence relating
to the Zions litigation:
I will also/ for clarification, make clear that no
claims are made in this litigation relating to the
Zions litigation. That's over. We are simply trying
to show what the contentions were so we can understand
what was settled.
R. at 4115.
Despite the representations of MLL's counsel at trial, it is
apparent that MLL presented the pleadings, correspondence and
testimony relating to the Zions case so it could argue that
Middletons' claims in the Zions case were unfounded, made in bad
faith and that the present case was a continuation of that same
conduct.

As MLL admitted in its own Memorandum In Opposition to

Defendants' Motions For JNOV or New Trial:
[M]ost of the evidence regarding the Zions litigation
didn't have anything to do with settlement discussions,
but rather focused on Richard G. Middleton's admissions
that the Zions suit was groundless, and that the repeat
of the same threats of groundless litigation was an
intentional wrong.
- 24 -

R. at 2419.
MLL argued that the Zions case was evidence of Middleton's
engagement in an improper course of conduct designed to thwart
all efforts of MLL to develop the leased property.

The merits of

the claims and defenses asserted by the Middletons in the Zions
case were argued and repeatedly raised in examination of
witnesses by MLL in an attempt to establish in this case, breach
of the Amended Ground Lease, improper conduct, inconsistent
statements and conduct warranting punitive damages. R. at 4028,
5032, 5720, 5747, 5749-50, 5818-19 and 5825.
An example of such improper evidence is the testimony Mr.
Burbidge elicited from MLL partner Dr. Ring regarding the events
and discussions that led directly to the Zions lawsuit:
Q.
All right. Tell the jury who spoke and what they
said.
A.
After we had finished our discussions and we were
getting up to leave, and just about ready to leave the
yard, Richard G. jumped up and said, "Just a minute,"
and ran over to us. And he caught John [Adair] and me,
and he said: "I iust think that maybe I'd better tell
you to be careful." He said that, "Tony and George
have never really liked this lease. They don't think
that Dad did a very good job with it, and they've
expressed their intention to try and break it."
R. at 4018.

[emphasis added.]

Mr. Burbidge even went so far as to attack the veracity of
specific allegations included in the defendants' pleadings in the
Zions' case.

For example, in direct examination of defendant

Richard G. Middleton, after a colloquy where Mr. Middleton
testified that he had not read the pleadings in the Zions case,
the questioning proceeded as follows:
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Mr. Burbidge: Would you turn to Paragraph 15 — or
Exhibit 15? Do you see that in front of you? You
identified it yesterday as the Answer and Counterclaim
filed on your behalf against Medical Leasing and Zions
Bank — excuse me, against Medical Leasing and Drs.
John Adair, his wife, Alice Jane Adair; Wallace H.
Ring, Harry C. Wong, June A. Wong, John E. Pace and
Nancy K. Pace. Do you see that?
A.

I see that.

Q.
And if you would be so kind to turn over to page 5
of that Counterclaim, Paragraph 2, it reads, doesn't
it, that under the terms of the aforesaid Amended
Ground Lease, the consent of the Middleton, Defendants,
is required for any sublease or agreement or contract
providing for the construction of any building or
improvement on the premises. Do you see that?
A.

I see that.

Q.
And you knew, whether you [had] read that
allegation or not, that that allegation was false,
didn't you?
Mr. Palmer:

I object.

The Court:

Overruled.

The Witness:
That is not the way my understanding is
of that Amended Ground Lease, no.
Mr. Burbidge: Exactly. So, do vou still wonder why
Medical Leasing is not anxious to talk to you about
other developments on the property. Dr. Middleton?
R. at 5032.
If this questioning were not enough, the improper use of
evidence going directly to the foundation and nature of the
claims in the Zions suit is further exposed in Mr. Burbidge's
closing argument where he stated:
Zions asked: "Is your consent necessary?" and the
answer was "no." A simple straightforward answer, and
they wouldn't give it. Hardly the spirit of Paragraph
12, which says that you have an absolute obligation to
certify whether you are in compliance with the
agreement.
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And so, we take it to R. P. Middleton.14 He says: "I
don't see any problem with this.11 And then the kids
and the lawyers get ahold of it. And Zions has to
bring a lawsuit to get a simple statement of rights
under the contract.
And the Middletons file false claims trying to overturn
the contract. And they invent things that didn't
happen. R.G. Middleton took the stand, and he agreed,
that the allegations that I read to him were false,
[R. at 5720.]

They go to R. P. Middleton to get consent in the Zions
deal, and they all jump on the bandwagon, and they all
file suit. The Zions litigation is informative because
it demonstrates their willingness, all of their
willingness, to participate in that kind of an
activity. [R. at 5747.]

Medical leasing had the right to sublease without
interference, without threats, without intimidation,
without interference, without the false statements made
in the Zions litigation; and it didn't get what it
bargained for. And that stopped the deal. There was a
breach of the Lease. And the damages were substantial.
[R. at 5749-5750.]

In Instruction No. 15, it says: "The elements are that
there was — that he intentionally interfered with
Plaintiff's existing or potential economic
relationship."
No question about that. Tony Middleton, in his diary,
articulates what the reasonable business expectation
is. For improper purpose? Absolutely. To get more
money he was not entitled to. Making false claims.
Making false claims that he made in Zions. And thereby
causing economic injury. [R. at 5750.]

14

R. P. Middleton is aged and infirm. He did not testify at trial.
Rather, Mr. Burbidge read portions of his deposition from the Zion's case into
the record - over the objections of defense counsel. R. at 5693-5700.
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Zions wanted something. They wanted a statement of the
truth. MIs vour consent required. Middletons?" And
the truth was, as R. P. testified: "No." And it cost
two years and $21.000 to get them to say that
They shouldn't have to pay $21,000 to get iust an
honest answer." [R. at 5818-19.]

[Middletons] hadn't been asked for anything but
consent. And the answer to consent is the same answer
that should have been given in good faith in Zions. and
it wasn't. [R. at 5825.]
As evidenced by both MLL's own admission and its counsel's
repeated statements in closing argument, facts alleged in,
connected to, giving rise to and arising out of the Zions case
were introduced by MLL in this action to prove elements of its
claims in this case, including the punitive damage claim against
Tony Middleton.

It is undisputed that the Zions litigation

terminated in a negotiated, compromise settlement.

Both the

express terms of the Stipulation of settlement and the relevant
case law preclude MLL from basing any of its claims, even in
part, upon allegations or evidence that the Middletons' claims in
the Zions litigation were meritless.

It was prejudicial error to

allow this evidence to be introduced and the verdict, on all
claims, must therefore be set aside.
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POINT II
THE 1980 AMENDED GROUND LEASE
REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFAULT AS A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT FOR BREACH OF THE
LEASE.
These Middleton appellants hereby adopt by reference the
argument set forth under Point I, of the co-appellants' Brief
filed by the law firm of Moyle & Draper.
POINT III
THE 1980 AMENDED GROUND LEASE
DID NOT CONTAIN ANY EXPRESS TERMS REQUIRING
MIDDLETON8 TO COOPERATE IN DEVELOPMENT OR
PROHIBITING THEM FROM INTERFERING WITH MLL'S
EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE PROPERTY.
These appellants hereby adopt by reference the argument set
forth under Points V A. and B. of the co-appellants' Brief.
George and Jean Middleton adopt by reference the argument set
forth under Point V C. of that Brief.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING MLL
ATTORNEYS FEES.
These Middleton appellants hereby adopt by reference the
argument set forth under Point VII, of the co-appellants' Brief.

- 29 -

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT ALL DEFENDANTS WERE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS.
Appellants George W. Middleton and Jean H. Middleton hereby
adopt by reference the argument set forth under Points II and III
and IV of the co-appellants' Brief.
POINT VI
MLL'8 CLAIMED DAMAGES WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The damage evidence MLL presented at trial was based
entirely on the assumption that, but for Tony Middleton's
threats, Boyer would have signed the first draft of the sublease
MLL prepared and delivered to Boyer on February 3, 1989 (or a
virtually identical sublease) and performed thereunder for its
50-year duration.

R. at 5202-5204. MLL had the burden at trial

of presenting substantial evidence in support of the damages
claimed and awarded.

For MLL to have met its burden,

[the] evidence must provide a sufficient
basis from which the jury could have
reasonably reached a verdict without
speculation or drawing unreasonable
inferences which conflict with the undisputed
facts.
Selle v. Gibb. 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Brady v.
Southern Railway, 320 U.S. 476, 480 (1943)).

M

A mere scintilla

of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury."
Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-375 (5th Cir. 1969);
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and s e e Crookston v, Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah
1991).
In e s s e n c e , MLL argued t o the jury t h a t i t should assume
t h a t , but for Tony Middleton's a c t i o n s , Boyer would have agreed
t o and performed under t h e "wish l i s t " terms of the
s u b l e a s e d r a f t MLL u n i l a t e r a l l y proposed.

first

This assumption i s not

a reasonable i n f e r e n c e and i s not supported by s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence.

I t i s , in f a c t , contrary t o d i r e c t , competent evidence

t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t even the b a s i c concept of the Sublease was
s t i l l being n e g o t i a t e d and would have changed before and through
the time the Middletons f i r s t learned of Boyer # s involvement i n
the summer of 1989.
The evidence i s unrebutted t h a t MLL's proposed Sublease
( P l a i n t i f f ' s Ex. 33) never even got beyond t h e i n i t i a l d r a f t .
a t 4557.

R.

Moreover, i n d r a f t i n g t h a t proposed Sublease, MLL's

a t t o r n e y , Mr. John Parsons, was not even in c o n t a c t with Boyer t o
negotiate the provisions.

R. a t 4557.

He simply prepared an

i n i t i a l d r a f t as i n s t r u c t e d by h i s c l i e n t and d e l i v e r e d i t t o
Boyer for c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

Id.

Furthermore, MLL did not send

Boyer t h e f i r s t d r a f t of a proposed s u b l e a s e u n t i l February 3 ,
1989, s e v e r a l days a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l Development Agreement
expired. 1 5

The t r i a l court ruled t h a t , as a matter of law, the Development
Agreement expired by i t s terms on January 3 1 , 1989 and, t h e r e a f t e r , MLL did
not have an enforceable contract or l e g a l l y binding development commitment
with Boyer. R. at 1078 (See. Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 2 ) . The c o u r t ' s
r u l i n g was c o n s i s t e n t with the express p o s i t i o n taken e a r l i e r by Boyer in h i s
lawyer's correspondence of November 22, 1989 and February 5, 1990. Ex.s 30 and
39.
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Under questioning by MLL's counsel, Boyer testified that the
deal being negotiated with MLL after January 1989 would not have
been the same and would not have included the same rental terms
as provided for in the 1988 Development Agreement and the
February 3, 1989 proposed Sublease:
Q.
[by Mr. Burbidge] Do you recall
negotiations and meetings occurring after
January having as their purpose the
negotiations of the Sublease?
A.

Yes.

Q.
All right. Even though the January 31,
date had passed?
A.
Yes, it had passed and —
lease being executed.

without a

Q.
All right. But the parties continued
negotiating the lease?
A.
In good faith, we were trying to come
together with some agreement, yes.
Q.
And the Sublease — the business terms
of the Sublease were the same business terms
as the Development Agreement, correct?
A.
Well, there were numerous negotiations
that would have changed the terms for
different permutations on the agreement. It
would have been several different agreements.
Q.
But in terms of the rent to be paid, do
you know of that changing?
A.
I think there were some scenarios that
would have allowed the rent to change, yes.
Q.

That it be escalators?

A.

Or the basic concept of the agreement.

R. at 4851-4852. (emphasis added).

In short, Boyer's testimony

made it apparent that, after January 1989, the entire deal was up
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in the air.

This testimony is fully consistent with the fact

that the sublease was never executed.
Consistent with Mr. Boyer's testimony and contrary to MLL's
argument, Boyer's counsel, Vic Taylor testified that after
reviewing the February 3, 1989 proposed sublease, he responded on
Boyer's behalf by voicing concerns over various significant
provisions in the draft, including the rent formula, and by
sending his letter of March 14, 1989, requesting substantial
changes in the sublease, concessions from the Middletons as well
as identifying Mmajor business hurdles."

R. at 4558; Ex. D-39.

Mr. Taylor specifically stated in his letter:
As we have indicated, the foregoing items do
not constitute all of the substantive areas
of concern with respect to the sublease, but
only some of the major business hurdles to be
resolved before proceeding.
Id. at p. 4.

Mr. Taylor's letter clearly indicates that Boyer

was not accepting the first draft of the sublease as defining
"the deal."

It was merely a starting point.

At trial, MLL attempted to make the concerns outlined in Mr.
Taylor's letter disappear by arguing that Boyer ignored his own
attorney's advice.

MLL's "substantial" evidence in support of

this was rank hearsay testimony from MLL partner Wally Ring
regarding a meeting on July 25, 1989 with Roger Boyer, Greg
Gardner, Vic Taylor and MLL's attorney, John Parsons.
2378.

Dr. Ring testified as follows:

Q.
What did you understand the purpose of this
meeting in July to be?
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R. at

A.
Well, to continue the process of developing this
lease that we had agreed we were going to sign.

Q.
Did the meeting relate to specific provisions of
the proposed settlement?
A.

It did.

Q.
All right. Do you recall any specific provisions
or issues being mentioned, and just answer that "yes11;
and then, if so, tell me just generally what
provisions?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.
There were requests that Boyer be provided with
notice, right to cure, attornment, those are the things
that I can remember.
Mr. Burbidge: All right. And with respect to those
issues, who brought up that on behalf of Boyer?
A.

Vic Taylor.

Q.
And with respect to those issues, did Roger Boyer
express his view about whether or not those could be
resolved?
A.

Yes.

Q.
All right.
Boyer say?

And in t h a t r e s p e c t , what did Roger

Mr. Hunt: Objection: Hearsay. 16
The Court: Overruled.

The Witness:
Boyer s a i d t h a t t h o s e problems could be
d e a l t w i t h , d o n ' t pay any a t t e n t i o n t o h i s a t t o r n e y , i t
was not a p o i n t of i s s u e .

16

Shortly before t h i s o b j e c t i o n , and out of the j u r y ' s presence, the
court heard considerable argument by counsel on t h e hearsay o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s
testimony, but u l t i m a t e l y allowed t h e testimony. R. at 4105-4112.
-
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Mr. Burbidge: ....What did Mr. Boyer say?
A.
He said: "That's not important. We don't need to
deal with that. We can work around that. Let's get —
go ahead and make this deal." He said: "I came here to
make a deal. I didn't come here to break one."
R. at 4117-4121.

On cross examination by Mr. Palmer, Dr. Ring

repeated that, at that same meeting, Mr. Boyer told Mr. Taylor
that there was nothing there "that we can't work around." R. at
4424.
MLL presented similar hearsay testimony from its attorney,
John Parsons, regarding the same July 25, 1989 meeting:
A.
The meeting started with Vic Taylor putting out
his concerns, the same concerns that he had had over
the last several months.

He [Taylor] talked about attornment and nonrecognition,
talked about consent and he talked about participation.
Shortly into that discussion, Dr. Ring, who at that
point was adamantly exercised, stopped him, and with a
raised voice said, "We are not going to the Middletons.
We've told you many times we are not going to
Middletons with any of those things."
Roger Boyer jumped into the conversation, and, in
effect, waiving off his lawyer, said, "We are here to
make a deal, not break a deal. Let's get on with the
deal"—17
Mr. Gurmankin: ....[W]hat do you mean in effect waiving
off his lawyer?
A.
Well we lawyers sometimes get carried away —
excuse me to the rest of the lawyers in the room— but
we lawyers sometimes get carried away in negotiating
transactional propositions for our clients. And what I
Mr. Palmer interjected here an objection to Mr. Parsons'
characterization of Mr. Boyer's statement. The objection was overruled.
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meant by that was — and I'm subject to this too — I
may be pressing points for my client, my client, in
effect, tells me: "Stop", and waives me off; "I'm not
interested in those things." And that's what I
understood Boyer to be doing, saying : "Stop. I'm not
interested in those things. We are here to get this
deal done."18
R. at 4530-4533.

In further hearsay, Mr. Parsons testified that,

in a June, 1989 telephone conversation, Mr. Gardner, Boyer's
project manager, told him that Boyer was still interested in the
property and wanted to make a deal.

R. at 4527-28.

MLL also

relies on Mr. Gardner's testimony that he and Mr. Boyer relied on
their own judgment, rather than their attorney's, where business
issues were concerned.

R. at 4791-4792.

In spite of MLL's assertions and hearsay, there is simply no
substantial, competent, admissible evidence in the record that
Mr. Taylor or Boyer ever withdrew any of their requests or
concerns regarding the sublease.

In fact, the direct evidence

from these witnesses at trial is that neither Mr. Boyer nor Mr.
Taylor ever changed their opinions that these financing issues
and business hurdles had to be addressed.

R. at 4876-77.

Roger Boyer himself specifically testified at trial that he
believed the items requested in Mr. Taylor's letter were
necessary to obtain financing and that he did not change his mind
in that regard:

Mr. Palmer again objected and moved to strike this testimony, but
was overruled. Mr. Parson's understanding of what Roger Boyer was doing or
saying is certainly not competent evidence on the issue of Boyer's intentions
respecting the deal.
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Q.
[by Mr. Hunt] Did you believe that the
requirement or the items stated in Mr.
Taylor's March 14th letter would be necessary
in order to get some financing on the
project?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Did Mr. Parsons, the attorney for
Medical Leasing, ever change vour mind about
whether or not Mr. Tavlor/s concerns would
have to be addressed in order for you to get
financing?
A.

Ho.

R. at 4876-4877. MLL made no attempt to impeach this testimony,
which came from its own witness.
Mr. Taylor also testified that his position on the "major
business hurdles" identified in the March 14, 1989 letter never
changed despite arguments by MLL and its attorney.

Nor did Mr.

Taylor's position change after he received additional
information, including the Stipulation entered in the Zions
litigation. (Exs. P-16, P-17).

R. at 5443-44.

In May of 1989, The Boyer Company contacted Gary Banks, a
mortgage broker with whom Boyer regularly did business, to seek a
second opinion on the financeability of the proposed project with
MLL.

R. at 4800-01. Although Mr. Banks believed that the

project was too complicated to attract financing, he contacted
Mr. Greg Bell, a lawyer representing commercial lenders and
familiar with Boyer, to get his input.

R. at 5396-99.

On May

30, 1989, Mr. Bell wrote back to Messrs. Banks and Boyer, stating
his opinion that the project was too complicated to attract a
lender.

Ex. D-18. Mr. Bell specifically stated in his letter
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that he was in agreement with Vic Taylor's March 14th letter.
Id.
When Tony Middleton was first contacted in August, 1989, MLL
had made no effort to redraft the sublease to accommodate any of
Boyer's requests or concerns even though it was presented to
Boyer and his counsel six months before anyone contacted Tony
Middleton. and despite MLL's repeated requests that Boyer execute
the sublease.

R. at 4199, 4557; Exs. D-30, P-33.

The only inference which can be drawn is that, before he had
any communications with Tony Middleton, Boyer had refused the
deal in the form presented in the draft sublease.

MLL went to

the jury with only this particular "deal" with Boyer and claimed
it was the only possible productive use for the property and that
the Middletons did and would prevent every other possible
productive use on the property.
MLL has maintained steadfastly that there was a deal with
Boyer and that "but for" Tony Middleton's alleged threats it
would have been consummated.

As the theory goes, the deal

embodied in the February 3, 1989 proposed Sublease was alive
until late September when the alleged threats were made and
thereafter, everything became a giant salvage operation.

The

theory is clever in its attempt to capture a moment in time and
attribute all things to it, but it finds no support in the
evidence.

MLL relies upon mere speculation to establish that but

for Tony Middleton's interference, Boyer would have executed the
Sublease MLL proposed.

This is not enough to sustain the
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Verdict. See, Gregory v, Fourthwest Investments. Ltd., 754 P.2d
89 (Utah 1988).
Any inference to be drawn from the circumstances is,
moreover, completely destroyed by overwhelming direct evidence to
the contrary.

Selle v. Gibb, supra.

The most telling evidence

comes from Roger Boyer and Vic Taylor.

On November 22, 1989, Vic

Taylor wrote in response to John Parson7s demand letter of
November 17th and stated:
Contrary to the statement made in your
letter, representatives of The Boyer Company
have not at any time made any representations
" . . . that the Land Lease would be executed,
construction commenced, and that the
Development Agreement would be extended and
considered enforceable, . . . " (emphasis
added)•
Ex. D-30.
When questioned about this letter, Roger Boyer testified:
Q.
(By Mr. Hunt) Are you taking a look at
Exhibit D-30, Mr. Boyer?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And did you receive a copy of that
letter on or about the time Mr. Taylor sent
it?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Did you agree with what Mr. Taylor
stated in that letter?
A.

Yes.

R. at 4880.
The direct evidence completely contravenes the inferences
and hearsay which MLL claims to support its verdict.

There was

no viable deal at any time after the Development Agreement
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expired, and MLL had stubbornly refused to take the action
necessary to make the deal financeable and hence acceptable to
Boyer.

To blame this failure on Middletons after the fact is

nothing more than sleight of hand. It finds no substantial
support in the record.
Thus, not only was the jury improperly instructed on the
theory of damages (as noted infra), but the record contains
insufficient evidence to justify application of the theory.
Middletons are entitled to have the judgment below reversed or,
at the very least, a new trial.
POINT VII
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MLL FAILED TO SATISFY THE
IMPROPER PURPOSE AND IMPROPER MEANS ELEMENTS
OF ITS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM.
In Leiah Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Oregon definition
of intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
Leiah. 657 P.2d at 304. That definition was elaborated on in
Straube v. Larson. 600 P.2d 371, 374 (Ore. 1979) as follows:
[T]he defendant's improper intent, motive or purpose to
interfere was a necessary element of the plaintiff's
case, rather than a lack thereof being a matter of
justification or privilege to be asserted as a defense
by the defendant. Thus, to be entitled to go to a
jury, plaintiff must not only prove that defendant
intentionally interfered with his business relationship
but also that defendant had a duty of noninterference'
i.e., that he interfered for an improper purpose rather
than a legitimate one or that defendant used improper
means which resulted in injury to plaintiff.
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Thus, even i f MLL could e s t a b l i s h i n t e r f e r e n c e and causation,

it

must be able t o s a t i s f y one of the a l t e r n a t i v e elements of
"improper purpose or improper means. H
A.

Improper Purpose

In determining whether improper purpose e x i s t s , c o u r t s "look
t o t h e predominant purpose underlying t h e defendant's conduct. 11
Leiah, 657 P.2d a t 307 ( c i t i n g W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of
T o r t s , § 129 a t 943 (4th Ed. 1971)).

"A purely malicious motive,

in t h e sense of s p i t e and a d e s i r e t o do harm t o t h e p l a i n t i f f
for i t s own sake, w i l l make the defendant l i a b l e for
interference. 1 1

id.

Where the defendant has a proper purpose in

view, however, "the addition of i l l w i l l toward t h e p l a i n t i f f
w i l l not defeat h i s p r i v i l e g e . "

Id.

MLL claims t h a t Tony Middletons' improper purpose was "To
get more money he was not e n t i t l e d t o . "

R. a t 5755.

To support

t h i s , MLL p o i n t s t o Tony Middleton's diary e n t r i e s and testimony,
and Wally Ring's testimony.

R. a t 4361 and 4127-29.

All of t h i s

evidence e s s e n t i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Tony Middleton's purpose in
" i n t e r f e r i n g " was t o obtain a d d i t i o n a l money for t h e
Middletons. 19

There i s no evidence, t h a t Tony Middleton's goal

Tony Middleton's relevant diary e n t r i e s read as f o l l o w s :
Last night I got a hold of Roger a f t e r having t r i e d
through t h e week without success t o do so and i t turns
out t h a t Dr. Wong, Ring and Adair are t r y i n g t o g e t
the Boyer Company t o develop both r e t a i l shops as w e l l
as business o f f i c e s on the property. Roger's company
i s so strong t h a t they can do without subordination,
and I suspect we are dead in the water the way t h a t
stupid contract i s put together by Uncle Dick and
William Morel. I am going t o meet with Roger t h i s
coming Tuesday morning t o go over the plans and s e e i f
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was anything other than to obtain additional financial gain for
his family.

Such purpose is not sufficiently "improper11 to

support a tortious interference claim.
In Leiah, the court found that there was substantial
evidence that the defendant had deliberately injured the
plaintiff's economic relations but that injury was only an
intermediate step toward a "long-range financial goal."
657 P.2d at 308.

Leigh,

Because the court concluded that economic

interest was controlling, it held that the evidence would not
support a jury finding of improper purpose.

Id.

Thus, to satisfy the improper purpose element, MLL had to
present substantial evidence to show that the Middletons'
predominant purpose was to injure MLL.

MLL was unable to do so.

See, Leiah, 657 P.2d at 307 (citing St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway Co. v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 133 (5th Cir. 1979)).

The

evidence adduced at trial instead established that Tony
Middleton's predominant purpose was financial gain.
B.

Improper Means

The evidence adduced at trial similarly fails to support a
finding of the alternative element of "improper means". The
improper means requirement is satisfied where:

there is something that can be done about it, but my
strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have to live
with the idea that those birds will derive a very
handsome income off the development without actually
including the actual owners of the land at all.
Ex. P-37.
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the means used to interfere with a party's
economic relations are contrary to law, such
as violations of statutes, regulations or
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence
are clearly "improper" means of interference.
Leiah. 657 P.2d at 308 (citing Searle v. Johnson. 646 P.2d 682
(Utah 1982)).
Commonly included among improper means are
violence, threats or other intimidation,
deceit or other misrepresentation, bribery,
unfounded litigation, defamation, or
disparaging falsehood, [emphasis added.]
Id. (citing Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582
P.2d at 1371, (Ore. 1978), n. 11).
MLL claims that Tony Middletons/ improper means were his
threats of suit if the Middletons were not allowed to participate
financially in the benefits of the development of their own
property.

The evidence at trial demonstrated that Tony Middleton

said to Boyer that "if there was going to be any development,
Middletons were entitled to receive some proceeds" and "there was
a significant possibility that if the property was developed
without Middleton participation, there would be a suit."

R. at

4361.
These acts of Tony Middleton are certainly not "illegal or
tortious in themselves."

MLL, however, takes the position that

the threatened litigation would have been unfounded and therefore
the threat of suit itself constituted improper means.

The

question for this court is simply whether a threat of suit by one
party to a contract, without more, can form the basis of the
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other contracting party's tortious interference claim.

As a

matter of law, such threats are not actionable*
Leiah, suggests, as indicated above, that "threats or other
intimidation" or "unfounded litigation" may constitute improper
means. 657 P.2d at 308.

The phrases quoted in Leigh actually

constitute the core conduct of a number of recognized torts.
They are not simply random descriptions of characteristic
conduct.

In this case, the evidence does establish that Tony

Middleton threatened litigation.
there was litigation.

It does not establish that

It is, in fact, undisputed that no suit

regarding the proposed Boyer development was ever filed.

Whether

a threat itself is actionable must, obviously, depend on the
nature of the threat.

A threat to bring a legal action in court

should never be actionable.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791
P.2d 587, 590 (Cal. 1990), the Supreme Court of California
considered the closely analogous issue of "whether it is proper
to impose liability for inducing a potentially meritorious
lawsuit."

The court concluded:

[A] plaintiff seeking to state a claim for intentional
interference with contract or prospective economic
advantage because defendant induced another to
undertake litigation, must allege that the litigation
was brought without probable cause and that the
litigation concluded in plaintiff's favor.
Id. at 598. The court noted that its decision was based on
concern "not to chill the rights to petition the courts for
redress of grievances."

Id. at 597. The Pacific Gas court went

to explain:
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The torts of inducing breach of contract and
interference with prospective economic advantage have
been criticized as protecting the secure enjoyment of
contractual and economic relations at the expense of
our interest in a freely competitive economy. We have
been cautious in defining the interference torts, to
avoid promoting speculative claims • . .. Given the
criticism of these causes of action and the dangers
inherent in imposing tort liability for competitive
business practices, we have no motivation to expand
these torts so that they begin to threaten the right of
free access to the courts. Our legal system is based
on the idea that it is better for citizens to resolve
their differences in court than to resort to self-help
or force. It is repugnant to this basic philosophy to
make it a tort to induce potentially meritorious
litigation. To permit a cause of action for
interference with contract or prospective economic
advantage to be based on inducing potentially
meritorious litigation on the contract would threaten
free access to the courts by providing an end run
around the limitations on the tort of malicious
prosecution.
Id. at 597-98 [emphasis added and citations omitted.]
In reaching its decision in Pacific Gas, the California
Supreme Court approvingly cited the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision in Blake v. Levy. 464 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 1983).

There,

the Connecticut court adopted elements of a tortious interference
claim as applied in Utah.

Noting that "there is no basis of

policy for distinction between" tortious interference and
malicious prosecution claims, the court held that a party
alleging a tortious interference claim based on unfounded
litigation must allege and prove termination of the preceding
suit in its favor.

Id. at 56.

Where courts have held that a party alleging tortious
interference based on the filing of unfounded litigation must
allege and prove resolution of the litigation in its favor, it
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necessarily follows that a mere threat to file unfounded
litigation is likewise insufficient basis for such a claim.

The

threat to sue is even further removed from resolution of that
suit.

It is repugnant to public policy to discourage potential

litigants from stating their positions and alleged rights before
resorting to the courts.
There is no question that allowing a threat of litigation
alone to support an interference claim would threaten free access
to the courts, settlements short of litigation, and even business
negotiations.

Such a result is not only repugnant to sound

public policy, but also directly contrary to this court's
pronouncements supporting free access to the courts for redress
of grievances as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Art. 1, §
11.

See. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
The instant case exemplifies the dangers recognized in

Pacific Gas and Blake.

After being approached by Boyer regarding

the proposed development on the Middletons' property, Tony
Middleton attempted to negotiate for the Middletons to
participate in the economic benefits of development.

Ex. P-37.

He subsequently told Boyer and Wally Ring that, if development
proceeded without participation by the Middletons, members of the
family would probably sue.

R. at 4361.

The Boyer Company's*

lawyer, Vic Taylor, believed that the Middletons would, in fact,
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have a colorable claim if development proceeded as structured in
MLL's proposed Sublease.20

Exs. D-14 and D-30; R. at 5437-39.

Although MLL now argues that any suit by the Middletons
would have been unfounded and frivolous, MLL and Boyer obviously
weren't willing to stand on that argument at the time.

If the

threats were so obviously frivolous, why didn't MLL and Boyer
simply proceed with the development as proposed and take their
chances in court?

If they subsequently prevailed in court and

established that the Middletons claims were in fact frivolous,
they could then have brought an action for abuse of process.
One need look no further than the shocking outcome of this
case —

a verdict in excess of $2.5 million dollars —

to realize

the chilling effect MLL's suggested rule of a law would have on
business negotiations between parties to a contract and on free
access to the courts.

What should Tony Middleton have done when

Boyer arranged their meeting?
should he have said,

Should he have said nothing?

Or

fl

The Middletons will never sue anyone,"

thereby waiving rights Boyer's own lawyer recognized the family
might have to challenge the sublease?

Under MLL's theory, it

could have sued the Middletons for silence or any statement other
than a blanket waiver of rights.
"no win" situation.

MLL placed Tony Middleton in a

A situation in which, regardless of Tony's

zu

In hie letter of March 14, 1989, Vic Taylor stated that he believed
the rental structure of the Sublease "violated the letter and spirit" of the
1980 Amended Ground Lease with the Middletons. Ex. D-14. Mr. Taylor
subsequently testified at trial that, even after hearing MLL's arguments, he
never changed his opinion on this issue. R. at 5443-44.
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response, MLL could effectively blame him for its own failure to
close its proposed deal with Boyer.
It is certain that, although MLL and the Middletons are
still parties to the 1980 Amended Ground Lease, none of the
Middletons will ever discuss this Lease or any matters regarding
the subject property with MLL again.

Such a result impairs both

access to the courts and the effective operation of contracts in
a business setting.
The judgment on the tortious interference claim should
accordingly be reversed.
POINT VIII
MIDDLETONS, AS OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTY AND LANDLORDS TO MLL, WERE
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED TO INTERFERE IN
SUBLEASE NEGOTIATIONS.
The trial court erred in failing to rule, as a matter of
law, that Middletons were absolutely privileged to interfere in
MLL's sublease negotiations with Boyer.

Privilege is an

affirmative defense which does not become an issue unless the
plaintiff is able to establish that "the acts charged would be
tortious on the part of an unprivileged defendant."

Leigh, 657

P.2d at 304 (citing Top Service, 582 P.2d at 1371).
This Court has recognized that "even though a defendant's
action brings about a breach of contract, he is not liable where
the breach was caused by the doing of an act which he had a legal
right to do."
1962).

Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602-603 (Utah

In Bunnell, this court recognized Prosser's application

of the rule as follows:
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If [defendant] has a present, existing economic
interest to protect, such as the ownership or condition
of property, or prior contract of his own, or a
financial interest in the affairs of the person
persuaded, he is privileged to prevent performance of
the contract of another which threatens it . . •
Id. [emphasis added.]
The chief practical difference between a claim for
intentional interference with contract and a claim for
intentional interference with prospective economic relations is
that "a broader range of privilege to interfere is recognized
when the relationship . . . interfered with is only prospective."
Pacific Gas. 791 P.2d at 590; gad, inc. v. ALN Assocs.. Inc.. 757
F.Supp. 901, 906 (N.D. 111. 1991).

This is because the latter

claim is much more speculative and the interest being protected
is less certain.

As noted above, the trial court granted

Middletons' Motion for Summary Judgment on MLL's interference
with contract claim, but submitted the interference with
prospective economic relations claim to the jury.

R. at 1077-79,

1532.
Middletons have an existing economic interest of the type
recognized by Utah courts.

Not only are they the fee owners of

the land which is the subject of MLL's proposed sublease and
development, (R. at 4216-18) but they have a prior, existing
lease with MLL.

Ex. P-3.

Courts have recognized a privilege

under similar circumstances.

In Berafeld v. Stork. 288 N.E.2d

15, 18 (111. 1972), the court concluded "that a lessor had a
sufficient economic interest in his property to interfere in a
sublease that caused a potential purchaser not to buy a tenant's
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business.11

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an economic

interest more acute than that of a property owner in the
development of his land or that of a lessor in the lessee's
compliance with the terms of their lease.
The trial court erred, in failing to rule that the
Middletons were privileged as a matter of law.
not have been submitted to the jury.

The issue should

Accordingly, the Judgment

on the tortious interference claim should be reversed.
POINT IX
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ERRONEOUSLY
PERMITTED A DOUBLE RECOVERY AND THE JUDGMENT
IMPROPERLY RELIEVED MLL OF ITS DUTY TO
MITIGATE DAMAGES.
A.

The Verdict was Based Upon Improper Damage

Instructions.
Jury Instruction No. 29, entitled "Compensatory Damages11 was
submitted to the jury over Middletons' objections.21

It provided

in relevant part:
If, after considering the evidence in this case and the
instructions I have given, you should find the issues
in favor of the Plaintiff, then it is my duty to tell
you what damages the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover. It would be a sum which you believe, from the
evidence, will fairly and reasonably compensate the
Plaintiff for any damage Plaintiff has suffered as a
proximate result of the Defendants' acts, which
includes the anticipated profits of which Plaintiff was
deprived, provided they are not mere speculation.
Instruction No. 29, R. at 1547 (See, Appellants' Addendum,
Exhibit 4 ) .

See, Transcript of Exceptions To Jury Instructions, R. at 5915.
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The compensatory damage f i g u r e the jury subsequently
included i n t h e Verdict was presented t o t h e jury as MLL's
e x p e r t ' s c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e present value of t h e r e n t a l income
MLL would have r e c e i v e d from Boyer i f Boyer had entered a
s u b l e a s e as contemplated in the 1988 Development Agreement (Ex.
P-22) and paid r e n t thereunder through t h e year 2040.**

MLL's

e x p e r t , Mr. Norman23, further t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e damage f i g u r e
included i n the v e r d i c t was based on t h e assumption t h a t t h e r e
can be no productive use of the property for t h e remaining 48year term of t h e 1980 Amended Ground Lease.

R. a t 5204.

The

f a t a l problems with t h i s theory and the i n s t r u c t i o n s are t h a t
they allow a double recovery and completely r e l i e v e MLL of

its

duty t o m i t i g a t e ongoing damage.
The j u r y ' s Verdict awarding MLL t h e present value of t h e
next 48 y e a r s ' r e n t a l income on the property r e l e a s e d MLL from
any i n c e n t i v e t o r e l e t t h e premises and l e f t i t with t h e very
l i k e l y opportunity t o enjoy a double recovery.

The Verdict gave

MLL t h e f u l l 48-year value of the Boyer s u b l e a s e in a d d i t i o n t o

MLL presented i t s damage c a l c u l a t i o n s i n Exhibit 47, prepared by Mr*
Norman. Exhibit 47 s e t forth three a l t e r n a t i v e s c e n a r i o s : 1) assuming t h a t
MLL would never be able t o r e c e i v e any income from the property over the
remaining 48 years under i t s Lease, the present value of MLL's damages was
c a l c u l a t e d t o be $2, 582,780 (R. at 5210); 2) assuming t h a t MLL would be able
t o secure a sublease t e n years from the t r i a l date, damages were c a l c u l a t e d t o
$1,419, 049.00 (R. at 5210-11); and 3) assuming MLL secured a sublease f i v e
years from t h e t r i a l , damages were c a l c u l a t e d t o be $1,005,179.00 (R. at 52151 6 ) . The J u r y ' s Verdict accepted the amount presented in scenario No. 1. R.
at 1574.
23

Mr. Norman presented himself as an expert in accounting and finance.
R. at 5241-42.
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all benefits of the possession and control of the property for
the next 48 years.
It is axiomatic that the law abhors double recovery of
damages.

Restatement (Second) of Property, S 10.2, provides

that: "damages may include one or more of the following items as
may be appropriate so long as no double recovery is involved
...."[emphasis added].

See, also. Ancrelos v. First Interstate

Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Brundacre, 674 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983).
Although MLL argued that, as a result of Tony Middleton's
threat of litigation in 1989, the property could not be put to
any economically beneficial use for the remaining 48 years under
the lease, such a notion is patently absurd.

MLL's own expert,

Henry Schwendiman, testified that this property, which is zoned
C-2 is located at "one of the top ten intersections in the
state."

R. at 5094.

Furthermore, the transcript of a meeting on

February 15, 1990 (after the filing of this lawsuit) between
Boyer and MLL established that, even after commencement of this
lawsuit, Boyer was still interested in doing some kind of
development on the property.

R. at D-58. Any economically

beneficial use of the property, whether as a parking lot,
Christmas tree lot or office building, would result in a windfall
or double recovery to MLL.24

Illustratively, Middletons' counsel, by chance, noticed that a
Christmas tree lot was, in fact, in business on the subject property in
December, 1992, and the Boyer Company still had a nTo Lease" sign on the
property.
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B.

The Judgment Improperly Relieved MLL of its Ongoing

Duty to Mitigate Damages.
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896
(Utah 1988), this Court addressed the very problem presented by
the verdict in this case.

The rule the Court adopted provides:

[I]f the trial occurs before the end of the
lease term, a judgment cannot be entered for
rents that have not yet accrued; any damage
award must be limited to taking account only
of rents that have accrued as of the trial
date. To recover for later accruing rents,
the landlord must bring a supplemental
proceeding or proceedings in which it can
prove that additional rents have accrued and
that reasonable efforts to mitigate those
losses have been taken.
Id. at 906.

Only such a rule ensures, as to the party in

possession, that "serious efforts are made to redeploy the rental
property in a productive fashion by those who are best able to
accomplish that end and who are best able to prove that required
mitigation efforts have been carried out.11

Id.

[W]hen the [lease] term has not expired by
the time of trial, it is impossible to
evaluate the mitigation efforts the landlord
will have to make in the future with respect
to rents that have not yet come due, and it
is equally impossible to determine whether
those efforts will be successful in reducing
losses from future accruing rents. Some
means must be devised to permit recovery of
actual losses occasioned by future accruing
rents while ensuring that the landlord
fulfills its duty to mitigate losses.
Id. at 907.
To avoid both the possibility of a double recovery and to
encourage ongoing mitigation and development of the property by
MLL, Middletons expressly requested a jury instruction consistent
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with the rule of the Reid case.

R. at 1505, 1512-13.

When the

trial court declined to accept Middletons' requested damage
instruction, Middletons specifically objected on the record to
the damage instruction given for its failure to comply with Reid.
R. at 5914-15.*

Recognizing that the Verdict allowed MLL a v i r t u a l l y certain
double recovery and provided no other incentive t o put the
subject commercial property to beneficial use, the t r i a l court
made a well-intentioned, but flawed attempted t o remedy the
s i t u a t i o n by including in the Judgment provisions allowing the
p o s s i b i l i t y of some future income from the property being paid
back to the Middletons.

In denying Middletons' p o s t - t r i a l

motions, Judge Rigtrup noted h i s concerns:
The prospect of a 2.6 — roughly — million dollar
judgment and the further prospect of landlocking the
use of the land for 48 years i s not, i t seems to the
Court, a good r e s u l t . There might be those who think
the property would best be u t i l i z e d by greenbelting i t ,
maybe. But the Court in the Reed [ s i c ] case suggested
Counsel, Mr. Frankenburg, presented Middletons' e x c e p t i o n s t o the
jury i n s t r u c t i o n on damages:
We a l s o take exception t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 29, and o b j e c t t o t h a t
i n s t r u c t i o n . That i s t h e compensatory damages i n s t r u c t i o n . The
grounds for our o b j e c t i o n s t o t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n are: What we have
in t h i s case are claims made by t h e P l a i n t i f f s for l o s s of
p r o j e c t e d income from a l e a s e of r e a l property. And by f a i l i n g t o
i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t compensatory damages must be l i m i t e d t o
t h o s e proven t o have accrued as of the date of t r i a l , the Court i s
allowing P l a i n t i f f s a p o s s i b l e double recovery, f a i l i n g t o
encourage m i t i g a t i o n and f a i l i n g t o encourage the economic
development of r e a l property in accordance with p u b l i c p o l i c y .
And, in support of t h i s o b j e c t i o n , we c i t e the Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha c a s e , the Utah Supreme Court case from 1986, at 776 P.2d
896.
R. a t 5914-15.
R. at 5915. On Behalf of Richard G. Middleton, et al., Mr. Palmer joined in
this objection. R. at 5914.
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that that was not good public policy. And since the
property is zoned Commercial, the Court doesn't view
that as appropriate public policy.
R. at 2915 (See, Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 5).
After reaching the puzzling conclusion that Reid did not
apply because this case involved "loss of future profits . . .
through the vehicle of rents" and is "not a case of rents," (R.
at 2916) Judge Rigtrup nonetheless ordered:
But to avoid the possibility of the property being tied
up, the Court will require in the order that the Court
have continuing jurisdiction in this case should any
development plan come forward. And the Court reserves
the option of treating that in the way of mitigation of
the awarded damages.
R. at 2920.

He further clarified that this would not affect

MLL's ability to collect the Judgment.

Id.

Pursuant to the trial court's ruling the final Judgment
provided:
It Is Further Hereby Ordered that notwithstanding the
finality of the judgment, the court shall retain
jurisdiction of this matter in the following limited
respect: In the event that either Plaintiff or
Defendants obtain a development agreement for the
undeveloped portion of the subject property during the
period of time that the subject Amended Ground Lease is
in effect on said property, Defendants may apply to the
court for consideration of whether and to what extent
they may share in any proceeds from such development
agreement as credit against the final judgment.
R. at 2966.
Thus, although the trial court properly recognized the
concept of retained jurisdiction, it erroneously omitted the most
important steps - limiting the current Judgment to damages
accrued as of the date of trial, and concurrently imposing a duty
of mitigation on the party in possession.
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Despite the trial

court's intentions, its ruling and consequent modification of the
Judgment clearly serves to completely relieve MLL of all
incentive to fulfill its ongoing duty to mitigate!

By awarding

MLL a final judgment including all its claimed rental income
through the end of the Lease26, the court quite effectively
relieved MLL of any duty to mitigate its damages for the
remaining 48 years under the lease.

Obviously, if MLL collects

the judgment, it has absolutely no incentive to relet the
property, as the court might then require some, or all, of the
rental proceeds to be passed on to the Middletons.

R. at 2920-21

and 2966.
The Middletons, who might stand to receive a benefit if the
property is relet, are not in possession and thus are unable to
put the property to any beneficial use.

They can't employ a

realtor or make a single commitment to a prospective tenant
without the concurrence of MLL and the court - which neither are
required to give.

This unworkable situation exemplifies the

mischief which results when the policy of mitigation is turned on
its head.
The concept of mitigation of damages is grounded in
traditional contract law principles and requires that ffa party
injured by contract breach may not recover damages that he or
she, with reasonable effort, could have avoided.
at 906, n. 8.

Reid, 776 P.2d

It is well established that a repossessing

It should also be noted that MLL also has the significant benefit of
interest on this award, at the rate of 12% per annum, until paid.
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landlord has a duty to mitigate its losses through taking
commercially reasonable action, which usually means seeking to
relet the premises.

Reid, at 906.

In Reid this Court recognized:
[T]he economies of both the state and the
nation benefit from a rule that encourages
the reletting of premises, which returns them
to productive use, rather than permitting a
landlord to let them sit idle while it seeks
rents from the breaching tenant.
776 P.2d at 905.
In the instant case, MLL is both a tenant and a landlord.
Its alleged loss arises solely out of its claimed lost rental
income as a landlord to Boyer. R. at 5255.

The only evidence in

the record concerning the subject of mitigation establishes that
MLL took no steps as a landlord to sublease the property to
anyone other than Boyer.

Dr. Wong testified that MLL had made no

effort to find a subtenant or developer other than Boyer:
Q.
[by Mr. Frankenburg] Isn't it true, Dr.
Wong, that neither you nor your partners have
made any attempt, since January of 1990, to
find another tenant, other than The Boyer
Company, or another developer, for the 3900
South property?
A.
It is true we have not sought to get
anyone else to develop the property.
Q. And the same is true since September of
1989, isn't it?
A.

That's correct.

R. at 4937-4938.

This testimony was direct, unrebutted and met

the traditional defense burden of initial proof on the issue of
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mitigation.

Dr. Ring testified as well that no efforts were made

to re-let the premises.

R. at 5046.

This case, just like Reid, involves a landlord suing for
unpaid rent.

It is undisputed that the tort and contract damages

MLL claimed at trial were based entirely on calculated lost
rental income MLL argued it would have received from Boyer over a
50 year period.

MLL's expert, Mr. Norman, who formulated the

damage calculations presented to the jury testified as follows:
Q.
fAlll your calculations are based upon income from
fthe] lease, right?
A.

Income from the Lease?

Q.

Right.

A.

Income as contemplated from the Boyer lease, yes.

Q.

Rental Income?

A.

That is correct.

R. at 5255.

That the Middletons are also landlords and not

tenants is immaterial.

As the party in possession, MLL's duty to

mitigate is the same in either case.
What distinguishes Reid from other cases involving lost
profits is that in Reid, the claimed lost profits were in the
form of real property rents.

The Utah Supreme Court expressly

approved of public policy considerations which apply equally to
any case which involves "lost profits" from real estate rental:
[W]e find persuasive the reasons advanced in support of
the trend rule requiring the landlord to mitigate its
losses. For example, the economies of both the state
and the nation benefit from a rule that encourages the
reletting of premises, which returns them to productive
use . . . .
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Id. at 905.
Like any other landlord, MLL has a duty to mitigate by
returning the property in its possession to productive use.

The

retained jurisdiction approach adopted in Reid is designed to
encourage the fulfillment of this duty.
This approach, therefore, should provide an incentive
to the landlord to see that its mitigation duty is
fulfilled, lest it be denied some of the damages it
would otherwise be entitled to.
Id. at 908.

On the issue of damages, t h i s case i s indistinguishable from
Reid.

Whether the defendants are breaching tenants or in some

other position i s of no significance.

The policy rationale i s

the same wherever the p l a i n t i f f seeks damages for l o s t future
rent from real property of which i t retains possession.
MLL has, in an effort to circumvent the requirements of
Reid, argued that the jury already determined that mitigation was
impossible.

This, however, i s exactly the type of theory which

Reid i s s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to preclude.

Reid recognizes that

such a theory can only be based on highly speculative evidence
and would improperly r e l i e v e the p l a i n t i f f of i t s ongoing duty to
mitigate. 2 7

Referring t o the r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n approach, the Court in Reid
stated:
This approach does not depend on s p e c u l a t i v e p r o j e c t i o n s of future
e v e n t s t h a t mav lead t o under- or overestimation of the l a n d l o r d ' s
losses.
[emphasis added.] 776 P.2d at 908.
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This Court has expressly stated the rule which must be
applied to encourage ongoing mitigation.

The trial court erred

in failing to instruct the jury that it could not award MLL any
future damages and in including in the Judgment provisions
relieving MLL of any incentive to mitigate.

This Court should

remand for a new trial to correct the error in the jury
instructions and instruct the trial court to fully apply retained
jurisdiction consistent with Reid.
POINT X
NIDDLETONS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS
FEES PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 16 OF THE 1980
AMENDED GROUND LEASE.
The 1980 Amended Ground Lease, 1 16, provides:
16. Attorney's Fees. If landlord or tenant default
hereunder or file a suit against the other which is in
any way connected with this lease, the defaulting party
shall pay to the prevailing party a reasonable sum for
attorney's fees, which shall be deemed to have accrued
on the commencement of such action and shall be
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to
judgment.
Exhibit P-3, f 16.
In other words, a defendant may recover if the plaintiff
pleads but fails to prove a breach of an express provision of the
Lease.

In that situation, there is no default, but defendant is

the prevailing party in a suit" in any way connected with the
lease. ••
Middletons therefore request that this Court grant them
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in defending those claims the
Court resolves in their favor.
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CONCLUSION
This appeal presents error in at least three fundamental
areas where sound legal and policy considerations mandate
reversal.
The policy of finality upon which settlement of cases
depends, and which in turn, administration of justice relies, is
flaunted by the admission of the Zions evidence in the court
below.

Its admission prejudiced the jury and effectively led to

re-trial of the Zions case within the framework of this action.
Prejudicial error resulted.
The policy requiring mitigation of damages and fostering
beneficial use of realty was ignored by the lower court,s damage
instruction.

Disguised by the rubric that MLL's damages were

"future profits11 not rents, the trial court circumvented the rule
of the Reid case and the important policies which it furthers.
This court should require the lower court to follow the rule in
Reid to foster the important policies the case encourages.
There exists no more important policy in our form of
government than preserving and facilitating the resolution of
disputes through the courts.

Chilling those rights by

discouraging would-be litigants from using the process promotes
far less civilized methods of dispute resolution contrary to the
public interest.

It would be grave error for this court to allow

a "threat of suit", standing alone, to form the core of a
business tort upon which a multi-million dollar judgment rests.
To allow such a judgment to stand sends precisely the wrong
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message.

That message is: Don't use the system to defend your

rights - resort to other means - the system isn't safe.
court can and must send the opposite message.

This

This court must

say: Using the system or threatening to use the system is a safe
harbor; until abuse of the system is established, it is safe to
use.

Without such a message, Utah's constitutional provision

guaranteeing open courts for redress of grievances will be hollow
rhetoric indeed.
These Appellants hereby request that the Judgment of the
lower court be reversed, or in the alternative, that they be
granted a new trial and that they be awarded their attorney's
fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1993.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

By

GEORGE A . i f W T&
KURT M. FRAJ/KENBURG
AttorneysMfor Defendants

Anthony W. Middleton, Carol S.
Middleton, George W. Middleton
and Jean H. Middleton
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